Ray Dalio: Lessons From 2008
2008 will forever be remembered in the financial world as one of the greatest market crisis of all time. It was a year in which a lot of mistakes occurred, and a lot of errors that had been covered up during the years before, were finally exposed.
All investors, no matter what their experience, industry or firepower were tested during 2008 and 2009 but the crisis also provided a case study for investors about the risks and opportunities that lie ahead.
By analyzing the mistakes made in the run-up to and during the crisis, we can streamline our investment process today to ensure that we don’t make the same mistakes again. And this is exactly what Ray Dalio did in his year-end 2008 annual letter to clients of Bridgewater Associates.
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Ray Dalio: A crisis driven by human nature
Using the typical Bridgwater approach, Dalio starts the letter by laying out the root cause of the market turbulence during 2008. At the time writing, Dalio believed the root cause was a reflection of human nature. The crisis was wholly caused by people operating in a manner consistent with their individual characteristics and together in ways typical of group dynamics. In other words, people created their circumstances, which they reacted to, which caused new circumstances that they reacted to, and so on. And they did this in ways that weren’t very complex or unique.
It's easy to explain why investors reacted in such a way. As Dalio points out, what happened in 2008 has happened many times before. However, unlike previous recessions, which occur regularly frequently and most investors know how to handle, the dynamic that occurred in 2008 had never happened before in most people's lifetimes.
Most people learn from their previous experiences, which prepares them for every eventuality if the experience occurs a second time. But as most of the general population never experienced a decline such as the one seen in 2008, almost all of the investors, businessmen and government officials affected by the decline, couldn’t believe it was happening as they had never planned for it, considered it implausible, and didn’t understand it.
To quote Dalio, “2008 was a year in which those who built their strategies on the basis of what happened in their recent lifetimes did not understand what happened in 2008 and did so badly, and those who had a perspective of what happened in long ago times in faraway places did well.” In other words, if you build a strategy optimised to the prevailing investment environment at the time, without planning for all eventualities, considering how it would work in all circumstances, and not just those seen in recent years, you will inevitably do very badly— exactly what happened to a lot of people in 2008.
“Since I believe that a big common mistake that caused many investors problems in 2008 was not having a broad enough perspective, I believe that one of the most important lessons for those who did badly in 2008 is to have a “timeless and universal investment” perspective, which means to broaden your perspective to understand what happened in long ago times (e.g., in the 1930s) and faraway places (like Japan and Latin America)” -- Source: Ray Dalio 2008 letter to investors.
It’s been proven time and again that even Wall Street’s highest-paid analysts don’t know what’s about to happen, so investors always need to consider the full range of possibilities and make sure the worst-case scenarios are tolerable.
The biggest mistake
Investors and asset managers' biggest mistake in 2008 was that they had large, concentrated exposures to assets and portfolios that do well when the economy does well, and badly when the economy does badly. In other words, the majority of the investment world held highly cyclical investments heading into 2008 and many haven’t considered the effect a worst-case scenario (an economic slowdown) would have on their portfolio.
Dalio points out that Investors and asset managers had this skewed exposure for three reasons.
Firstly, beta exposures were not diversified; exposures were concentrated in cyclical assets. Why? Human nature. Investors are biassed to invest in those assets that performed best during the timeframe is that in their frame of references.
Secondly, alpha exposures also lacked diversification and portfolios were skewed to do well in good times and poorly in bad times. Dalio writes that the average hedge fund was about 70% correlated with stocks during 2008. Why was this the case? Well, the root cause once again lies in human behaviour. There is a tendency for investors to chase those strategies that have worked well in the past so, alphas like betas became those strategies that worked in the recent past, the strategies that worked in good times.
And thirdly, the risk and liquidity premiums effects on returns are correlated to the betas and alphas in the portfolio. So when the economy did badly, these premiums rose and also hurt returns.
All of the three key points above made every investor's and asset managers portfolios highly sensitive to cyclical trends. But as Dalio points out, investors would have been reluctant to own such cyclical portfolios if they considered the disaster scenario, which in this case was Japan. At the time Dalio penned his year-end 2008 letter to Bridgwater investors, Japan’s leading stock index was down 70% from where it was 20 years before after years of poor economic performance.
“So, in reflecting on 2008 and the lessons for the future, I believe that one the most fundamental questions investors should ask themselves is whether or not it is logical to have this huge bias to do well in times that are better than are discounted (i.e., to be so concentrated in assets and alpha strategies that are positively correlated with equities). Personally, I believe that having such huge biases is never logical, let alone at this time. So, I believe that another important lesson of 2008 for most investors is to avoid having systematic biases in your portfolio, which means to restructure your portfolio so that it is less vulnerable to any one environment by having better diversification between and within betas, alphas, and risk premiums.” -- Source: Ray Dalio 2008 letter to investors.
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